Private Equity and Venture Capital Fund Performance: Evidence from a Large Sample of Israeli Limited Partners^{*}

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This version: May 2023

Abstract

We use a newly-assembled data set on all investments by Israeli pension providers in private equity and venture capital funds over nearly 20 years. Our detailed data contain complete cash flows to and from each fund and each investor, allowing us to evaluate the realized returns which have been mostly unavailable for non-US-based funds and limited partners. We obtain three main results: (i) The performance experienced by Israeli LPs has been slightly below performance measures derived from the US-based literature and data sources. This finding appears to be driven by both limited access to top performing, seasoned, US funds, as well as by limited skill in selecting first-time US funds; (ii) Investments in local Israeli funds have outperformed investments in foreign funds, which we attribute to both superior access to, and superior selection skills of, local funds; (iii) We compare our data and results to those based on Preqin, one of the most commonly used commercial data bases, and find that Preqin tends to omit small funds as well as funds with poor performance, both within and outside the US. While Preqin may provide reliable estimates of industry-wide performance, it may not always reflect the actual returns realized by non-US based limited partners.

Keywords: Institutional Investors, Limited Partners, Private Equity, Venture Capital.

JEL Codes: G20, G23, G24.

^{*}We would like to thank conference participants at the 2022 European Financial Management Association annual conference and the HEC Paris Entrepreneurship Workshop for their helpful comments. We are especially grateful to David Robinson and Johan Cassel Pegelow for their extremely helpful comments.

1. Introduction

Pension funds and institutional investors around the world have been allocating an increasing fraction of their assets under management to private equity (PE), venture capital (VC), and other types of private funds.¹ Public pension funds tracked by Preqin, for example, have steadily increased their allocations to this asset class over the past decade, with the median allocation rising from 18.1% in 2010 to 30.3% in 2020, and 79% of investors saying that they expect to allocate a larger proportion of their funds to private equity by 2025 (Lee (2020)).

While allocations to PE and other private investment funds have been steadily increasing, there is limited systematic evidence on the performance (realized returns) of non-US based institutional investors, the limited partners (LPs) of these funds. The performance of non-US LPs may differ from what has been documented for US LPs for various reasons such as differences in access to top performing funds (Sensoy et al. (2014)), differences in fees (Begenau and Siriwardane (2022)) and differences in skill or ability to select successful PE or VC fund general partners (GPs) (Cavagnaro et al. (2019)).²

In this paper we utilize a newly assembled and highly detailed data set on all capital calls and distributions associated with investments in PE and VC funds by the largest eight institutional investors in Israel. Much like their peers elsewhere, institutional investors in Israel, including pension funds, life insurance plans and other forms of long-term savings known as provident funds, have increased their allocations to illiquid assets from 12% of assets under management (AUM) in 2010 to 17% in 2020. Their investments in PE and VC funds have increased from a mere 1% of their AUM in 2010 to 5% in 2020. This increase in the allocation of funds to PE and other related funds coincided with a dramatic increase of 250% in the total value of AUM during this time period, driven by the introduction of mandatory retirement savings. As a result, the volume of investment by Israeli LPs in PE and VC funds has become economically large in absolute, not only relative, terms.

¹See, for example, Lerner et al. (2008), Ivashina and Lerner (2018), and Binfare et al. (2023).

 $^{^{2}}$ Earlier work by Lerner et al. (2007) documents large heterogeneity in the performance of different classes of LPs and Da Rin and Phalippou (2017) show that LPs vary significantly in the practices they employ when investing in PE and related assets.

The eight LPs whose investment performance is at the core of this study are the largest institutional investors in Israel, managing 76% of all retirement savings. Their cash flow information constitutes part of the information that the institutions managing retirement savings are mandated to report to the Capital Market, Insurance, and Savings Authority at the Ministry of Finance. The data set is therefore free of survivorship and other biases documented in the literature in the context of some commercial data sources on PE and VC fund performance. Furthermore, in contrast with the limited availability of data on cash flows associated with non-US-based LPs in commonly used commercial data providers, our detailed cash flow data enable the calculation of performance measures such as the Public Market Equivalent (PME) relative to several traded benchmarks, whereas the existing literature has relied primarily on IRR-based measures for non-US LPs and GPs.

The performance of Israeli pension funds is interesting primarily because it is likely to be indicative of the performance of non-US based institutional investors elsewhere. The pension system in Israel is comprehensive, where every employee and employer must deposit a fixed fraction of the employee's income each month. These long-term savings are managed by for-profit, non-bank institutions, primarily insurance companies and other non-bank investment managers. In many ways, this pension system resembles the retirement savings plans of many developed (OECD) countries.³ In addition to its structure, the Israeli pension system is interesting because of its rapid growth. The main consequence of the introduction of a mandatory retirement saving system in Israel has been an increase in AUM of close to 10% p.a. over the past decade, reaching a total AUM of about 2.3 trillion ILS (about 700 billion USD) as of the end of 2019. The Israeli pension system may offer lessons for similarly structured, fast growing, retirement savings systems in other countries.

Although not the main focus of the present study, the performance of Israeli LPs in their VC (as distinct from PE) investments may be of interest for another reason. According to the OECD (2016), VC investments relative to GDP in Israel is the highest in the world and Israel's reputation as the "start-up nation" makes the documentation of returns to investment in the Israeli VC industry particularly interesting. While there is an extensive literature on the growth of the high-tech sector

³Banks are not allowed to operate in the long-term savings market following a 2006 reform.

in Israel, there is no systematic evidence that we are aware of on the financial returns realized by local LPs. The data used in this study suggest that the average (as well as the median) return has not been very high in comparison with relevant traded equity benchmarks.

The evidence presented below is related to the vast literature on the performance of PE and VC investments. While many studies suggest that PE funds have outperformed public markets in the 1990s and early 2000, recent evidence is more nuanced. With respect to VC funds, there appears to be considerable variation across time periods and between funds (see, for example Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Harris et al. (2014), Brown and Kaplan (2019), Korteweg et al. (2022)). Importantly, the existing evidence is based nearly exclusively on the experience of US-based limited partners investing in US-based funds. Evidence on the performance of LPs and funds outside the US is rare.

The empirical analysis in this study is based on cash flows and net asset values (NAVs) for about 1,400 investments in PE and VC funds of various types including buyout, venture capital, real estate, debt, infrastructure and co-investments, for a 20-year period ending in December 2019. Using this information, we provide comprehensive evidence on the net-of-fee return realized by Israeli LPs by computing PME measures of performance relative to six equity and two debt benchmarks (which we use for private debt funds).

Our first finding is that PE performance is slightly lower than what has been documented for US LPs in the literature (Harris et al. (2014), Korteweg et al. (2022)). It is also lower than the average performance of funds listed in Preqin or Burgiss in our sample time period. One possible interpretation for the lower performance is limited access: Israeli LPs may not be able to gain access to the top performing ("top quartile") funds. This may be due to size: Israeli LPs are, on average, smaller than U.S. LPs; the average AUM of the eight largest pension funds in our data set is about 60 billion USD, whereas the average US pension fund manages about 200 billion USD in assets (Dyck and Pomorski (2016)). Limited access may also be driven by the Israeli LPs' remote geographic location relative to the majority of PE funds (Da Rin and Phalippou (2017)) and perhaps by the perception of some fund managers that LPs based outside North America are less prestigious than leading local (US-based) LPs.

Prior investment experience may also affect access: established LPs may be better able to form connections with established fund managers (Lerner et al. (2007)). Israeli LPs are relatively new players in the PE market, although we do not find much evidence to support the conjecture that their access improves over time.⁴ Conceptually distinct from limited access, though empirically not always straightforward to measure, LP performance may also depend on skill in identifying and selecting top performing funds and GPs (Cavagnaro et al. (2019)). We provide evidence that is consistent with both access and skill playing a role in explaining the inferior performance of Israeli (and possibly other non-US based) LPs relative to the stylized facts on the performance of US-based LPs. We do not find evidence that these LPs pay higher fees relative to their US-based peers in contrast with the evidence in Begenau and Siriwardane (2022).

After presenting estimates of average performance for the LPs in our sample, we compare the performance of investments in local (within-Israel) vs. foreign (in the US and elsewhere) funds. Hochberg and Rauh (2013) argue that, in the context of US states, political interference and home bias in investments result in poor performance of local, within-state, investments of US public pension funds in PE relative to their out-of-state investments. By contrast, Morkoetter and Schori (2021) gather international data and find that IRRs in foreign PE and VC funds, defined as funds located outside the LP's home region, are lower than the realized IRRs in local, within-Israel, PE and other investments consistently outperform investments in foreign funds. This result holds across virtually all fund types (the only exception is hedge funds). We attribute this finding to the LPs' superior access to top performing local funds, as well as to their skill in selecting local first time funds (which appears to be better than their ability to select foreign funds).

Finally, we also examine the possibility that the difference in returns realized by LPs in our data set and those reported by US-focused studies may be related to the nature of coverage in Preqin, one of the most commonly used data bases in the literature. Although it has been argued that data derived from Preqin are generally not severely biased (Kaplan and Lerner (2017), Harris et al.

⁴Recent work by Goyal et al. (2021) disputes the importance of access to high performing funds as a major factor explaining the investment choices of LPs. Instead, they argue that the high growth rates of capital allocations to PE is likely to lead LPs to invest in first-time funds.

(2014), Brown et al. (2015)), we find a large discrepancy in performance between the universe of funds that are held by LPs in our sample and the subset of these funds which are also included in Preqin. Funds that are missing in Preqin are not necessarily non-US based, but are typically small funds that exhibit poor performance relative to funds which are included in Preqin. This suggests that, while Preqin may be useful in estimating the returns generated by the PE/VC industry as a whole, it may not reflect precisely the returns realized by LPs who choose to, or are forced to, invest in relatively small funds that are unlikely to be top performers.⁵

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the institutional investors in our data set and the pension system in Israel. Section 3 presents the data, and section 4 the methodology and research design. In section 5 we present measures of realized performance for the institutional investors in our sample, including heterogeneity in performance by fund and institution characteristics. Section 6 presents a comparison of our data set with data from Preqin, and Section 7 concludes.

2. Institutional Background

This study is based on extensive and detailed data provided by institutional investors in Israel as part of their mandatory monthly reports to the Capital Market, Insurance, and Savings Authority at the Ministry of Finance. We access information on the eight largest institutions, managing 76% of all long-term (retirement) savings in Israel. We utilize only the eight largest institutions since the smaller institutions have been involved in mergers and splits, impairing the completeness of their reported cash flows.

The institutional investors in our data set manage three different saving instruments: pension funds, life insurance savings policies (funds), and provident funds which are a long-term savings instrument that differs from a pension fund in some technical respects that are not relevant to

⁵Studies investigating PE and VC fund performance from the fund's (rather than the LP's) perspective often use Burgiss, which is arguably more precise than Preqin. Data provided by Burgiss, however, cover LP investments only partially, maintaining the anonymity of both the funds and the LPs. The Burgiss data set "is sourced exclusively from LPs and includes their complete transactional and valuation history between themselves and their primary fund investments."

the discussion here. In terms of asset allocation, life insurance funds have the highest percentage of illiquid assets (our focus is on PE and VC funds), mainly because there are no transitions of savers across different funds.⁶ Provident funds are characterized by a low percentage of illiquid assets and allocation to PE and VC funds, primarily because of the high level of competition in this segment and the frequent transitions of savers across different funds. Finally, pension funds are the fastest growing saving instrument in Israel, largely due to a law enacted in 2008 which requires individuals to deposit funds into these savings instruments. The three saving instruments also differ in certain dimensions that are not directly relevant to the present study such as their fee structure and extent of competition. The institutional investors in our data set manage pension funds and other long-term savings instruments, as well as their own accounts, which we refer to below as their "nostro" accounts.⁷

The Israeli long-term savings market has undergone significant changes over the last fifteen years, mainly due to a regulation that forced banks to sell their long-term savings products to other institutions, primarily to insurance companies and other non-bank investment managers, some of which had managed mutual funds prior to the reform. As a result of this reform, and a 2008 law mandating savings for retirement by all, these institutions have experienced rapid growth in their assets under management.

Table 1 presents the value of AUM by institutions in our data set as well as their investments in PE, VC and hedge funds, both local and foreign. The values in parenthesis represent the percentage of assets managed by the institutions in our data set relative to the assets managed by all institutional investors in the long-term savings market in Israel. The institutions included in the sample account for 76% of total AUM, 81% of total investments in PE funds, and about 87% of total investments in VC funds. We are aware of no reason to expect that the smaller institutions not included in our

⁶Whereas in most long-term savings instruments in Israel savers can change the investment track or the managing company at no cost, in life insurance products there are significant switching costs. See a detailed discussion in Hamdani et al. (2017).

⁷Life insurance is the largest savings instrument in the Israeli long-term savings market and is managed by five of the eight institutions in our data set. In total, there are ten institutions managing life insurance products in Israel. Provident funds include mainly two saving instruments, differentiated by their investment horizon (long-term and medium term). All institutions in our data set manage both types of provident funds. In total, there are about 30 asset managers offering this saving instrument in Israel. Pension funds mainly include two savings instruments: mandatory pension savings and optional pension funds; the two types of funds are managed by both commercial institutional investors (included in our data) and by non-profit organizations such as certain labor unions.

data set are fundamentally different than those included.

The rapid growth in these institutional investors' AUM, as well as the low interest rate environment of the past decade, have led to an increase in their propensity to invest in alternative (illiquid) assets: real estate, private (non-traded) loans, as well as PE and VC funds. The NAV of investments in PE and VC funds has grown dramatically, from two billion ILS (about 500 million USD) in 2005 to 70 billion ILS (about 21 billion USD) in 2019. As presented in the Internet Appendix tables A1 and A2, much of the growth is driven by the increase in foreign, non-Israeli, funds, where Israeli institutional investors have invested twice as much as in local funds. Interestingly, only 7% of their investment are in VC funds (93% in PE funds), and 70% of the VC investments are local.

3. Data

We use two main data sources. The first is the complete series of daily cash flows from the eight largest institutional investors in Israel generated from their investments in private equity, venture capital, real estate, infrastructure, debt, and hedge funds. We focus on the performance of investments in about 300 PE funds and 120 VC funds over the period 2000 - 2018. The investments are divided by savings products, that is, pension funds, life insurance and provident funds, as well as the institutions' own investment (their "nostro" accounts). In addition to the daily cash flows related to each savings product and to the nostro account, our data set contains the NAV for each PE, VC, or other fund types.

The split between savers' retirement assets and the institutions' own accounts enables us to rule out possible concerns about conflicts of interest in the context of PE and VC investments. For example, a possible concern might be that institutional investors would invest in well-performing funds through their nostro accounts, when facing limited access to the top quartile funds. In practice, we find that there is an overlap of close to 90% between the funds associated with nostro and savings accounts, yielding almost identical performance for PE and VC funds allocated to savers and those allocated to the institutions' own accounts.⁸

⁸See Internet Appendix Table A3. With the exception of one institution (Institution F) there is no evidence for outperformance of the nostro accounts relative to the savings products. The exceptional case of Institution F is

The second data set we use is Preqin, one of the most commonly used data sets in the academic literature on private equity (see, Harris et al. (2010) and Brown et al. (2015); we also make some comparisons to Burgiss, another major data source. We use data from Preqin to compare the PE and VC funds that are included in our data set to funds listed in Preqin. The data provided by Preqin is gathered from multiple sources including voluntary data contributions.⁹ The voluntary aspect of these reports raises the concern that funds reporting their performance to Preqin are not a random sample, or do not reflect the entire universe of funds. To examine these issues, we ask, for each PE and VC fund in which the LPs in our data set invest, whether it is also listed in Preqin. For overlapping funds, we calculate performance using both the cash flows as they appear in our data set, as well as the cash flows reported by Preqin. We also record the size of the fund and its country of incorporation. In cases where the fund appears in Preqin, we obtain this information from its listing details. In cases where the fund does not appear on Preqin, we obtain this information from the fund's website and from the LPs themselves.

4. Methodology and Research Design

We measure fund performance using the public market equivalent (PME) approach of Kaplan and Schoar (2005), as this performance metric is considered superior to other commonly used methodologies such as the internal rate of return (IRR) and the cash multiples (Gottschalg et al. (2007), Phalippou (2008)).¹⁰ We calculate the aggregate PMEs for each limited partner by pooling all daily cash flows generated from each of their PE and VC investments. In essence, this generates for each LP a single, weighted average portfolio performance metric, consisting of all the LP's PE and VC investments, where the weights are the amounts invested in each fund. We also compute

apparently due to one successful Israeli PE fund in which the institution invested through its nostro account and not through the saving products.

⁹As stated on their website, "Since 2003, we have built valued relationships with fund managers, institutional investors and other industry professionals who are happy to provide us with data on their activities. We also obtain our data via various FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) requests, public filings and industry-recognized news sources. While FOIA remains an important source of data, Preqin also receives voluntary data contributions from more than 12,000 fund managers, and more than 10,000 funds."

¹⁰IRR and cash multiples involve serious problems including over-estimation of the variation of performance across funds and of the performance of the top quartile of funds. These measures are also amenable to easy manipulation, possibly distorting the fund manager's incentives. (Phalippou (2008)) claims that IRR is probably the worst performance metric one may use in an investment context, whereas the use of PME yields more reliable conclusions.

aggregate PMEs for investments by fund type (PE, VC, Real estate, etc.) by aggregating the full daily cash flow for each fund type across all LPs.

We use several equity and debt indices as benchmarks. For equity, we use tradeable ETFs tracking the following indices: (1) S&P 500: the 'SPDR' ETF; (2) Tel Aviv (TA) 125: the 'KESEM TA 125' ETF; (3) NASDAQ: the 'QQQ' ETF; (4) MSCI World: the 'iShares MSCI World' ETF; (5) MSCI ACWI: the 'iShares MSCI ACWI'. For debt benchmarks we use tradeable ETFs tracking the following indices: (1) ICE BofA US High Yield Index Option-Adjusted Spread and (2) iShares iBoxx \$ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF. All our calculations end in December 2019, so that inferences are not affected by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. We compute PME values both for funds that were liquidated, where the NAV is effectively zero, and for funds which are still alive, using the NAVs reported in the financial statements at the end of 2019. All flows and benchmark returns are converted to local currency (so that the chages in the exchange rate do not affect our results).

5. Results

5.1. Unconditional Performance

Table 2 presents PMEs calculated relative to six different indices. The PMEs are below 1.0 relative to the S&P 500 for all but one institution, with an average of 0.94. Relative to the NASDAQ, the PMEs are much lower, below one for all but one LP, with an average of 0.83. Relative to the Russell 2000 the average PME value is also just below one. The average PME's relative to non-US benchmarks is slightly higher (close to 1.1). Overall, it is evident that investments in the broad PE and VC asset classes have not outperformed the major US indices. In addition, the PMEs for funds established before 2010 ("liquidated funds") tend to be lower than the PMEs for the full sample, indicating that the relatively low returns realized by the Israeli LPs in our sample are not driven by "living" funds with positive net asset values (NAVs). Apparently, Israeli, and possibly other foreign (non-US-based) LPs, earn, on average, returns that are somewhat lower than those reported in the extant literature for US-based LPs.¹¹

To corroborate the finding that the LPs in our sample earned lower returns relative to those documented for US-based LPs, we also compare the Israeli LPs' PMEs to PMEs derived from Preqin and Burgiss for PE and VC funds which are located in Israel and in the US (as are the vast majority of the funds in our sample), for our sample period, 2000-2019. We find that the aggregate PME relative to the S&P 500 is equal to 1.04 in Preqin and 1.05 in Burgiss, substantially higher than the average PME generated by the investments of Israeli LPs.

The underperformance we document may be due to limited access of foreign LPs to top performing, US-based, or possibly due to their limited skills in identifying promising first-time funds. We elaborate on the empirical approach we use to draw these conclusions and the required assumptions below. We also explore below the possibility that some the performance differences may be "technical" rather than "economic," due to possible limitations in the coverage of Preqin and Burgiss.

5.2. Performance by Fund Type and Location

Table 3 presents average value-weighted PMEs, calculated by aggregating the cash flows for each fund type and geographical location across LPs. The results indicate that investments in local (Israeli) funds are associated with higher PMEs in comparison with investments in foreign, non-Israeli, funds, although the magnitude of the differences are not always economically large.¹² This result is consistent across all fund types, both equity and debt, with the exception of hedge funds. For PE funds, while the average PME of Israeli funds relative to the S&P 500 index, is 1.11, the PME of foreign PE funds is about 0.95. For VC funds, investments in Israeli funds are associated with a rather low PME of 0.87 relative to the S&P 500, which is still slightly higher than the PME of 0.85 associated with foreign VC funds. Israeli real estate funds are similarly associated with

¹¹The comparison, however, is not perfect since different studies use different samples and different time periods. See also Josh Lerner's testimony at the SEC (Link), suggesting a PME of slightly above one for US buyout funds in recent years relative to the Russell 3000 index.

¹²These results are not driven by exchange rates fluctuations, as all flows used in the PME calculations, both to investment funds and to the public market used as a benchmark, are converted to local currency.

a PME of 0.94 relative to the S&P 500 index vs. a PME of 0.81 for foreign real estate funds. Local infrastructure funds exhibit an average PME of 0.96 relative to the S&P 500, while the PME for the foreign infrastructure funds is 0.81. This pattern remains unchanged when analyzing the performance of debt funds: The PME of local debt funds relative to *Ishares* High Yield ETF is 1.08, while the PME of foreign debt funds is 0.93. Hedge funds are the only exception, where we find that foreign hedge funds outperform local hedge funds. The general pattern in which local funds outperform foreign funds, except for hedge funds, remains unchanged when we use alternative benchmarks.

Table 4 presents the average PMEs of PE and VC funds included in Preqin and Burgiss, by geographical region. Both PE and VC funds that are listed in Preqin and Burgiss and located in the US have higher PMEs than the foreign, non-Israeli, PE and VC funds in our sample.¹³ The average PME for PE funds located in the US drawn from Preqin is 1.09 and 1.12 according to Burgiss, while the average PME for foreign PE funds in our sample is 0.95. Similarly, the average PME in Preqin for VC funds that are located in the US is 0.96 (1.02 according to in Burgiss), while the average PME using our sample is only 0.85. It is hard to draw any firm conclusions regarding Israeli PE and VC funds included in Preqin and Burgiss since the number of observations is very small.

As an alternative to the value-weighted average PMEs, we also calculate PMEs based on equal weights, that is, where each fund is assigned a weight of one over the number of funds in the portfolio, regardless of the amount invested. The equally-weighted average PME relative to the S&P 500 is 1.15 for the Israeli PE funds and 0.97 for foreign PE funds (the comparable value-weighted figures are 1.11 and 0.95, respectively, see Table 3). The equally-weighted average PME for Israeli VC funds relative to the S&P 500 is 0.97, while the PME for foreign VC funds is 0.85 (the comparable value-weighted figures are 0.87 and 0.85, respectively). The differences between Israeli and foreign PE/VC funds continue to hold and are statistically significant with a p-value < 5%.

The fact that the PMEs calculated using equal weights are higher than the value-weighted average

¹³Most of the investments of the Israeli LPs in foreign funds are concentrated in the U.S.

PMEs implies that the LPs in the sample invest larger amounts in funds whose performance is relatively low, perhaps due to limited access to high-performing funds which are either not available at all or limit the amounts the LPs in our sample can invest in them. Stated differently, the difference in performance measures is consistent with decreasing returns to scale in these investments. Interestingly, the difference between the equally-weighted and value-weighted PMEs appears to be larger for Israeli PE/VC funds than for foreign funds. One interpretation of this finding is that, while the LPs in the sample face a constraint on the amounts they can invest in Israeli funds due to the small size of the market, investments in foreign funds tend to be concentrated in mediumperforming funds. This may explain both the lower average performance of foreign funds relative to local (Israeli) funds, as well as the smaller gap between PMEs calculated using equal weights and value weights in foreign funds.

In order to compare the performance of the Israeli PE, VC and other funds to that of foreign funds we estimate regressions where the dependent variable is fund performance (PME) relative to a benchmark. Each observation is an investment in a specific fund by a specific LP. We control for the fund's geographic location (location in Israel vs. elsewhere), fund type (PE, VC, debt, real estate, infrastructure and hedge funds), and the fund's vintage year. Standard errors are clustered at the unique fund and the vintage year levels.

Table 5 presents the results. The coefficient of interest, the dummy variable denoting local funds, is positive and highly significant for all benchmarks and across the different specifications, indicating that local investments in PE and other funds outperform investments in foreign funds. The magnitude of the difference in PMEs between local and foreign funds is in the range of 10 - 19 basis points, depending on the benchmark and specification. This is an economically large difference, given that the average PME is typically close to, or a bit below, one. In addition, we find that buyout funds, the omitted category, outperform almost all other fund types.

To make sure these findings are robust, we also evaluate the performance of Israeli and foreign funds that have already been liquidated (ceased to operate) and their remaining net asset value is zero. We focus on funds that were established before 2010; we do not include more recent funds where a NAV of zero may be due to extreme write-offs. The sample of liquidated funds is not subject to concerns associated with the "J-curve" of returns and the possibility that net asset values do not reflect an unbiased estimate of future payoffs. The results, presented in Internet Appendix table A4, indicate that the coefficient of interest, the Israel dummy, is positive, somewhat larger than in the full sample, and highly significant across different specifications. We conclude that our results are not driven by investments in funds that are still operating. In another robustness test we control for fund size. The results presented in Internet Appendix table A5 indicate that the local PE and VC funds outperform the foreign funds even after controlling for the size (AUM) of the fund and the magnitude of the coefficient on the Israel dummy is similar to that reported in table 5.

The evidence on differences in performance of local and foreign funds differs from that in Hochberg and Rauh (2013) in that local investments in our sample outperform, on average, foreign investments. The amounts invested within Israel are relatively low in comparison with the amounts invested in foreign funds (it is not clear if larger amounts could have been invested locally), and the realized returns on the large amounts invested overseas are not as high. One interpretation of this evidence is that Israeli LPs, and perhaps other non-US based LPs as well, have limited access to the top performing foreign, notably US-based, funds. Alternatively, non-US LPs may have poor skills in selecting first-time foreign PE and VC funds. There may, of course, be other reasons why local investments may outperform foreign ones, such as contractual agreements (fees) that are less favorable to non-US LPs. Below we present evidence consistent with the first two explanations, but less with the third one. In passing, we note that these findings point to the possible role of intermediaries in the PE and VC markets. These intermediaries, such as funds of funds, or separately managed accounts (SMAs), may be able to provide non-US based LPs with some access to top performing US funds, although it is unclear how the surplus, or rents, that might be generated by these intermediation services are distributed between the LP and the intermediary.

5.3. First-time vs. Seasoned Funds

The previous section indicates that the investments of the Israeli LPs in local, Israeli, funds have outperformed their investments in foreign funds. One interpretation of these results is limited access to the top performing foreign funds by Israeli LPs, and perhaps also other non-US-based LPs. In addition, these results may also be due to the LPs having better local fund selection skills in comparison with their ability to select foreign funds. We explore this issue further in this section.

Following Sensoy et al. (2014), we compare the investment performance of LPs in our sample in first-time vs. seasoned funds.¹⁴ According to Sensoy et al. (2014) the performance of first-time funds is likely to be inferior to that of more mature funds, and the demand for first-time funds by LPs also tends to be lower in comparison with the demand for seasoned fund investments, that is, access to first time funds is not restricted (Lerner et al. (2011)). We therefore compare the performance of the Israeli LPs' investments in first-time local funds vs. first-time foreign funds, so as to shed light on the LP selection skills in funds that have no previous track records and are not subject to investment constraints that might characterize seasoned funds with limited access.

We first we calculate the proportion of local and foreign investments in first-time funds. One possible motivation for investments in first-time funds is limited access to funds with better reputation. Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to test this conjecture without information on the populations of first time and seasoned funds in Israel and abroad. In practice, 25% of investments in foreign funds are in first time funds, whereas 40% of investments in Israeli funds are in first-time funds. This may be driven by the substantial development of the Israeli PE and VC industry in the last two decades. Put differently, Israeli LPs face a larger "supply" of first-time funds at home, in comparison with foreign first-time funds. Another interpretation may be that, when considering whether to invest in local funds, LPs have "informal" sources of information that help them evaluate the abilities of local first-time funds managers. For example, they might have worked with the person in a different setting. When considering an investment in first-time foreign fund managers, such "soft" or "informal" sources of information are much more limited.

We adopt a simple OLS regression specification to compare the performance of investments in firsttime funds with the performance of more established funds. The dependent variable is the PME of each fund using the 'SPDR' ETF to benchmark against the S&P 500. We include fund type,

¹⁴Hedge funds are excluded from this analysis because the distinction between first-time and seasoned funds is not as clear in the context of hedge funds as it is for PE and other funds whose lifetime is limited.

vintage year, LP fixed effects, and a dummy variable which equals one for first-time funds and zero otherwise. We also distinguish between Israeli and foreign investments.

Table 6 presents the results: While there is no statistically significant difference in performance between investments in local first-time funds and local seasoned funds, investments in foreign firsttime funds yield lower PMEs than investments in seasoned foreign funds. Because investment in first-time funds is less likely to reflect constraints due to limited access, this finding may indicate that the LPs in the sample have better skills in selecting local PE and VC funds in comparison with their ability to identify promising foreign ones. This conclusion holds, however, only under the assumption that the distribution of fund quality is similar among local and foreign funds; while this assumption is plausible, it is challenging to confirm it using the data available to us.

Table 7 provides additional estimates on the performance gap between local and foreign funds, distinguishing between first-time and seasoned funds. The dependent variable is the fund PME calculated relative to three benchmarks: Tel Aviv 125, S&P 500, and the Russell 2000. The dummy variable *Israel* equals one if the fund is local and zero otherwise. As in previous tables, we control for the vintage year of the fund, and include LP and fund type (buyout, VC, infrastructure, real estate, and debt) fixed effects. The coefficient of interest, the dummy variable denoting local funds, is positive and highly significant in all specifications and across the two different sub-samples, first-time as well as seasoned funds. This may be interpreted as evidence that the superior performance of local funds in comparison with foreign funds (table 5) is driven by two factors. First, better access to reputable local funds, reflected in the performance of seasoned local funds in comparison with seasoned foreign ones, since investments in top performing seasoned funds are likely to be subject to limited access. Second, better selection skills, as reflected in the performance of local first-time funds in comparison with foreign ones, again, subject to the assumption that the distribution of fund quality does not vary with fund location.

5.4. Reinvestment Decisions

Following Lerner et al. (2007) and Sensoy et al. (2014) we evaluate the reinvestment decisions of the sample LPs in local and foreign funds. This is an alternative way to evaluate the information available to the LPs: Because LPs that have participated in a fund typically get access to the same GP's follow-up fund, reinvestment decisions are unlikely to be subject to any access constraints. The analysis below is based on funds for which a follow-up fund was established. Within this subsample, we compare funds where the LP decided to invest in their follow-up funds, and "abandoned" funds, where the LP did not invest in any available subsequent fund. It is important to note that the decision to invest in a follow-up fund takes place about half-way through the life of the current fund (i.e., before the fund's final performance measures are realized and revealed to investors). We therefore consider the decision to invest in a follow-up fund as reflecting the LP's information and skill.

Table 8 presents PMEs relative to the S&P 500 for local and foreign PE and VC, split between "reinvested" and "abandoned" funds, where the term "reinvested" refers to current funds in which the LP has decided to invest a follow-up fund, and the term "abandoned" refers to current funds with follow-up funds in which no investment was made. The main result is that funds that experience reinvestment, both local and foreign, have outperformed abandoned funds. The differences are statistically significant for all fund categories except for foreign VC funds. Interestingly, the differences between reinvested and the abandoned funds is larger for local funds than for foreign funds, which may be interpreted as another indication of the Israeli LPs having better information on the local population of funds than that of foreign funds (again, subject to assumptions about the distribution of fund quality in the population).

We also analyze the effect of LP experience based on past investments in PE and VC funds on performance. The results in Table 9 suggest that the LPs' access to top performing foreign funds, or their fund selection skills, do not improve with experience. In a regression framework, where the dependent variable is the PME measured relative to the S&P 500, and the explanatory variables include the cumulative number of past investments for each LP as well as our standard set of controls, the coefficient on the LP's past investments in the sub-sample of foreign funds is negative, larger in absolute value, and more statistically significant than the comparable coefficient in the sub-sample of Israeli funds (which is not statistically different from zero). This finding may be explained by the fast growth of the LPs' assets under management over the last decade and their demand, or search, for investible foreign funds. This effect may offset the improved access, if there is any, due to the LPs experience and familiarity with the industry.

6. Comparison with Preqin

Our data set is based on highly detailed mandatory reports provided by the LPs themselves to the supervisory authority at the Ministry of Finance. It is therefore likely to be accurate, comprehensive in coverage, and free of biases which have been discussed in the literature in the context of commercial data sets such as Preqin. In this section we compare our data to Preqin, one of the most extensively used data sources in the literature, in order to better understand the determinants of non-US-based-LPs' investment performance as well as to shed light on possible limitations associated with the use of statistics derived from Preqin.

We begin by documenting the extent of overlap between investments in PE and VC, as reported by the LPs in our data set, with the fund-level data as reported by Preqin. We therefore identify funds included in the portfolios of the Israeli LPs in our sample as they appear on Preqin. For overlapping funds, we compare performance measures (PME and IRR) based on our data set with those derived from the available cash flow data in Preqin. There is a large number of funds that appear in Preqin but no further information on cash flows is provided on them. In such cases it is not possible to calculate fund performance based on Preqin. We therefore use funds appearing in our data set which are included in Preqin without their cash flows, as well as funds which do not appear in Preqin at all, in order to evaluate the completeness of Preqin's data.

Table 10 presents a comparison between the performance of PE and VC funds, both local and foreign, in our data set and those included in Preqin. We compute PMEs relative to the 'SPDR' ETF, tracking the S&P 500. Panel A presents the average PME for funds which are included in both our data set and in Preqin under the exact same LP and have cash flows reported in Preqin.

Panel B present the performance for funds in our data set and in Preqin under the exact same LP for which there are no cash flows reported in Preqin. Panel C focuses on funds included in our data set but not in Preqin, while Panel D shows performance measures for funds included in Preqin but not in our data sets. The columns contain the PMEs derived from each data set and the number of funds.

Panel A shows that the PMEs of foreign, non-Israeli, PE funds yield identical results when using cash flows as reported in our data set or in Preqin (87 overlapping funds); other types of funds include only a few overlapping funds, so it is challenging to draw unequivocal conclusions from this analysis. Importantly, the fact that we observe the same average PME across many overlapping PE funds, suggests that there are no major differences in the fees that Israeli institutional investors pay in comparison with the LPs on which Preqin data are based.

Panel B presents estimates of performance for funds included in our data set and in Preqin under the exact same LPs for which there are no cash flows reported in Preqin. We find that the average PMEs derived from the cash flows in our data set are mostly lower (with the exception of Israeli PE funds) relative to the funds in panel A, which have their cash flows reported on Preqin. The average PME drops from 1.03 in panel A to 0.95 in Panel B. One interpretation of this result may be that funds with poor performance do not share their cash flow data with Preqin.

Panel C presents the third comparison, focusing on funds included in our data set but not in Preqin. There is a significant number of such funds (147), in comparison with 277 overlapping funds. The PE and VC funds in this category, both Israeli and foreign, exhibit lower PMEs than the funds in panel A.

Panel D presents the PMEs, as of the end of 2019, of the funds that are listed in Preqin but not in our data set between the years 2000-2018. While the performance of the foreign PE funds is similar to the performance of the overlapping foreign PE funds in panel A, foreign VC funds that are listed in Preqin but not in our data set have outperformed the foreign VC funds in panel A. The performance of these funds is better than the performance of the overlapping funds that do not have cash flow data (panel B), and the funds that are omitted from Preqin (panel C). It is challenging, however, to draw any firm conclusions from the Israeli PE and VC funds that are listed in Preqin and not in our data set mainly because of the limited number of observations.

Table A6 in the Internet Appendix presents the IRRs of the different funds, in parallel to table 10. Again, performance is similar in our data set and in Preqin when both sources include cash flows as can be seen in Panel A. Note that the extreme IRR values of the Israeli PE and VC funds among the overlapping funds in Panel A which have cash flow data in Preqin is driven by the fact that Preqin has data on a very limited number of funds (only five Israeli funds in each category). The average performance is therefore largely affected by extreme values. For example, the Israeli PE funds have an average IRR of -6.79%, a result driven by one well-known Israeli fund with an IRR of -90%.

Panel B includes the funds that are listed in both data sets under the same LP but do not have their cash flow data reported in Preqin. Both foreign PE and foreign VC funds in this group have a lower average IRR than the funds that have cash flow data on Preqin (panel A). With respect to Israeli funds, PE funds in panel B have an average IRR value of 9.12%, in comparison with the very few Israeli PE funds in panel A which have an average IRR value of -6.79%. The opposite is observed for Israeli VC funds, with the funds in panel B having an average IRR value of 0.18%, while the average IRR for the small number of overlapping funds with cash flow data in Preqin is 18.32%.

We observe a similar pattern in panel C of Table A6, for funds that are not listed in Preqin at all. The aggregate average IRR is 1.81% in comparison to the average of 11.50% in panel A. The average IRR of the foreign PE funds is 1.93%, much lower than the average IRR of the foreign PE funds in panel A. However, foreign VC funds in Panel C have a higher average IRR than the funds in panels A and B. The Israeli PE funds have an average IRR of 0.28%, in comparison to IRR of 9.12% in panel B. We observe the opposite trend when analyzing the average IRR of the Israeli VC which is higher than the average IRR in panel B, and equals to 2.38%.

The comparison presented so far suggests that, while Preqin may provide a reliable indication of the overall performance of the PE or VC industries, it does not necessarily provide an accurate reflection of the returns realized by the LPs in our sample and possibly other institutional investors not based in the US. We now turn to examine more formally if there are any fund characteristics which are relevant to the probability of being included in (or excluded from) Preqin. Table 11 presents the comparison between a fund's country of incorporation and the average AUM of the overlapping funds and the funds that are not listed in Preqin. The table includes four panels: Panels A and B present funds by country of incorporation. These include the U.S, Israel, the UK, and other countries (Europe and East Asia) for overlapping funds and funds that are not listed in Preqin. Panels C and D compare the average fund size in millions of dollars of the two fund groups.

The results in Panels A and B of Table 11 indicate that Preqin tends to miss not only funds located outside the US: the proportion of omitted funds located in the US is similar to the general rate of omission. In addition, PE funds are more likely to be omitted than VC funds, with US VC much less likely to be omitted than Israeli VC funds.

Panel C and D present the average fund size in the different groups of funds. The average PE fund size is much smaller among the funds that are not listed in Preqin in comparison with overlapping funds. In US funds, the average omitted fund is almost half the size of the average overlapping fund. Omitted US VC funds are also smaller than the overlapping US VC funds. This is not the case for Israeli VC funds, although the small number of overlapping VC funds, Israeli and foreign, makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions, or comparisons, between PE and VC funds in this respect.

Table 12 presents Probit regressions, estimating the association of fund characteristics with the probability of being included in Preqin. We measure the effect of fund performance using PMEs relative to the S&P 500, and IRRs. Fund characteristics include fund size, measured in millions of US dollars; vintage year, where funds established prior to 2008 are the omitted category; and the fund's country of incorporation, where funds located in the US are the omitted category. We use three samples: (i) funds located in the US; (ii) funds located outside the US; and (iii) the full sample.

The results suggest that better performance is associated with a higher probability of being included in Preqin. The coefficients on performance are highly significant in all specifications, for both funds located in the US and elsewhere. Larger funds are also more likely to appear in Preqin; this effect is more pronounced for non-US funds in comparison to funds which are based in the US. Funds established before 2008, the omitted vintage group, have a higher probability of being listed in Preqin than later funds. This puzzling result may be due to the large increase in the AUM of the Israeli LPs and their rapidly growing investments in this asset class. Growth may have forced them to invest in first-time funds, whose probability of being listed in Preqin is presumably low. This interpretation is in line with Goyal et al. (2021), who find that LPs whose capital allocation to PE is fast growing are more likely to invest in first-time funds.

Finally, we analyze the association of fund characteristics with the probability of having cash flow data reported on Preqin. We restrict attention to funds which appear in that data base. The specification is similar to that used in table 12 except that the dependent variable takes the value one if the fund has cash flows reported on Preqin, and zero otherwise. The results indicate that performance and size play an important rule in determining whether a fund's cash flow data appear on Preqin: Better performance and larger size are associated with a higher probability of having cash flow data on Preqin. In addition, we find that funds which are located in the US are more sensitive to performance, while for funds which are located outside the US, size has a larger effect on the probability of having cash flows reported in Preqin.

We conclude that the Preqin data set is unlikely to relect the investment experience of non-US LPs. In addition to the substantial number of funds that appear in our data set but not in Preqin, the omitted PE funds' performance appears to be systematically poorer relative to that of included funds. In addition, we find that missing PE funds are mostly smaller than the overlapping funds. Stated differently, although Preqin may represent well the performance of the PE industry and of top US LPs, its under-representation of small and not-top-quartile funds may be important for evaluating the choice set of foreign LPs.

7. Conclusion

In this paper we utilize a newly-assembled data set on all investments by Israeli pension providers in PE and VC funds over the past 20 years. Our detailed data contain complete cash flows to and from each fund and each investor, allowing us to evaluate fund performance using PME (rather than IRR or cash multiples) measures, which have been hitherto unavailable for non-US-based limited partners. Our study contributes to the literature that seeks to shed light on investments by non-US LPs in PE and VC funds, especially in the context of performance comparisons between local and foreign funds. In addition, we try to shed light on some of the limitations of Preqin in this context.

We find that Israeli LPs' fund performance is slightly lower than the estimates reported in the USbased fund performance literature. This difference in performance is consistent with both limited access by foreign LPs to top performing seasoned US funds, as well as lack of skill in selecting first time, non-Israeli funds. We also find that, in contrast to Hochberg and Rauh (2013), investments in local, Israeli funds, both PE and VC, have outperformed investments in foreign, non-Israeli funds. We argue that this result is likely to be due to limited access by non-US LPs to top performing foreign (notably US-based) funds; it may also be due to the LPs poor skills in selecting first-time foreign, US-based, PE and VC funds. We do not find evidence consistent with differential fees.

Our analysis is consistent with the existence of two opposing forces may be at play: On the one hand, as their assets under management increase, LPs may become more established and improve their access to top performing funds. On the other hand, as assets under management grow, LPs may be forced to invest in "mediocre" funds and first-time funds. The assets managed by the Israeli LPs in our sample have grown dramatically over the last 20 years and their investments in foreign funds have also grown at a high rate, much like other institutional investors in many countries outside the US. The fact that this growth, and experience in PE/VC investment, is not associated with improved investment performance suggests that the latter effect, the decreasing returns, has been dominant.

Finally, we compare our data and performance measures to those derived from Preqin, one of the most commonly used commercial data bases, finding that Preqin tends to omit small PE funds, as

well as funds with poor performance, both within and outside the US, at roughly the same rate. This suggests caution in relying on Preqin to measure the investment performance of non-US-based LPs. At the same time, the comparison with data reported in Preqin suggests that differences in fees do not drive differences in performance between the LPs in our sample and US-based LPs.

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Table 1: Asset allocation in the long-term savings market in Israel

This table presents descriptive statistics on total assets under management (AUM, in billions of ILS) and net asset values (NAVs) of PE, VC and hedge funds held by LPs in our sample. Each column represents a different savings product. *Life Insurance*, the largest product in terms of AUM, is offered by five of the institutions in the sample. *Provident funds* consist of two savings instruments differentiated by their investment horizon, long-term and medium term. All institutions in our data set manage both types of provident funds. *Pension funds* include two savings instruments, mandatory pension funds and voluntary funds. Both types are managed by commercial institutions in our data set manage pension funds. *Nostro* allocations represent the institutions' own investments; we have data on Nostro investments for five institutions. We report allocations to PE, VC and hedge funds for each of the four investment categories. In this table, PE includes not only buyout funds but also real estate, infrastructure and debt funds. The percentage of total assets associated with the universe of Israeli long-term savings managers is given in parenthesis.

_	Life Insurance	Nostro	Provident Funds	Pension	Total
AUM	$375.8 \ (99\%)$	155.8 (87%)	$321.1 \\ (60\%)$	673.4 $(75%)$	$1526.1 \ (76\%)$
Private Equity	$19.3 \\ (99\%)$	$6.1 \\ (91\%)$	$12.6\ (61\%)$	$26.6\ (81\%)$	$64.6\ (81\%)$
Israel	4.4 (97%)	$1.9 \\ (87\%)$	${3.8} \atop (55\%)$	$4.6\(76\%)$	$20.2 \ (75\%)$
Foreign	$14.9 \\ (100\%)$	4.1 (94%)	$8.7 \\ (64\%)$	$22.0 \ (82\%)$	49.7 (83%)
Venture Capital	$1.5\(99\%)$	$0.3 \\ (95\%)$	$0.8 \ (60\%)$	$2.0 \\ (94\%)$	4.6 (87%)
Israel	1.0 (98%)	$0.2 \\ (99\%)$	$0.6\(62\%)$	$1.4 \\ (92\%)$	$3.2 \\ (86\%)$
Foreign	$0.5\(100\%)$	0.1 (100%)	$0.2 \\ (52\%)$	$0.6\(98\%)$	1.4 (88%)
Hedge Funds	$3.8 \\ (99\%)$	$0.4 \\ (95\%)$	${3.3} \ (49\%)$	$1.3 \ (71\%)$	$8.8 \\ (69\%)$
Israel	$0.7 \ (95\%)$	$0.3 \\ (99\%)$	$1.1 \\ (52\%)$	$0.4 \ (64\%)$	$2.5 \\ (68\%)$
Foreign	$3.1 \\ (100\%)$	0.1 (100%)	$2.2 \\ (48\%)$	$0.9 \ (75\%)$	$6.3 \\ (70\%)$

Table 2: Performance of PE and VC funds

This table presents estimates of the relative performance of PE and VC funds (including buyout, real estate, infrastructure funds, debt and hedge funds), for each of the LPs in our sample. We label the eight institutions A to H so as not to reveal their identity. We report PME measures calculated by pooling all cash flows and NAVs for all funds invested in by each LP for the entire sample period. For benchmarks we use tradeable ETFs tracking the following indices: (1) S&P 500: the 'SPDR' ETF; (2) Russell 2000: the 'iShares Russell 2000' ETF; (3) TA 125: the 'KESEM TA 125' ETF; (4) NASDAQ: the 'QQQ' ETF; (5) MSCI World: the 'iShares MSCI World' ETF; (6) MSCI ACWI: the 'iShares MSCI ACWI' ETF. The Estimates are calculated by pooling the cash flows of all funds in each year and summing the NAVs at the end of the period (for funds that are not yet liquidated). When computing PME for funds reporting in foreign currency, we first convert the cash flows, NAVs, and the benchmark return to local currency. Liquidated funds are defined as funds that were established before 2010.

Institution	S&P	Russell	TA 125	NASDAQ	MSCI	MSCI	Num of
	500	2000			World	ACWI	Funds
А	1.02	1.11	1.13	0.94	1.14	1.15	86
В	0.94	0.98	1.09	0.83	1.09	1.10	235
С	0.91	0.98	1.07	0.79	1.08	1.09	321
D	1.11	1.21	1.18	1.04	1.21	1.22	99
Ε	0.88	0.93	1.01	0.78	1.03	1.04	238
F	0.99	1.05	1.04	0.89	1.11	1.12	154
G	0.98	1.03	1.06	0.85	1.15	1.16	270
Н	0.97	1.06	1.04	0.89	1.08	1.09	12
All LPs	0.94	0.99	1.06	0.83	1.09	1.10	1,415
Only PE/VC	0.97	1.02	1.12	0.86	1.12	1.14	800
All except hedge funds	0.93	0.99	1.07	0.82	1.08	1.10	$1,\!171$
Liquidated Funds	0.91	0.92	1.03	0.78	1.10	1.12	664

Table 3: Public market equivalent (PME) by fund type and location

This table presents PME estimates by pooling all cash flows and NAVs by fund type. We report. performance separately for local and foreign funds. A fund is defined as local if it is incorporated in Israel, even though a local fund may invest in foreign assets. Panel A presents information on different types of equity-related funds with PMEs based on the S&P 500 and Tel Aviv 125 indices as benchmarks. We use ETFs tracking these indices: The 'SPDR' ETF and 'KESEM TA 125'. The ETFs can be found on 'investing.com.' Panel B presents information on the performance of debt funds which we benchmark using ETFs of two high yield debt indices: (1) ICE BofA US High Yield Index Option-Adjusted Spread and (2) iShares iBoxx \$ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF. Cash flows, NAVs and returns are all converted to local currency.

Panel A: Equity Fo	unds			
	S&P 500	TA 125	Num. of	Num. of Unique
			Investments	funds
Private Equity				
Foreign	0.95	1.07	336	249
Israel	1.11	1.32	204	57
Venture Capital				
Foreign	0.85	1.01	31	19
Israel	0.87	1.06	229	99
Real Estate				
Foreign	0.81	0.91	155	102
Israel	0.94	1.08	20	15
Infrastructure				
Foreign	0.81	0.90	43	30
Israel	0.96	1.22	57	28
Hedge Funds				
Foreign	1.04	1.00	191	115
Israel	0.98	1.05	53	29
	1			

Panel B: Deot I	Funas			
	High Yield	ishares HY	Num. of	Num. of Unique
	Bond		Investments	funds
Foreign	0.93	0.97	82	62
Israel	1.08	1.11	14	10

Table 4: Performance of funds listed in commercial data sets

This table presents estimates of performance for PE and VC funds established between 2000-2018, the same sample period as that of our main data set, as of the end of 2019. The sample is further split into different geographical regions. PMEs are calculated relative to the 'SPDR' ETF to benchmark against the S&P 500. The diversified multi-regional funds are focused on multiple market sectors, assets, and/or geographic regions.

Panel A: Preqin							
	Privat	e equity	Ventur	e capital			
	PME	Num. of	PME	Num. of			
		Funds		Funds			
US	1.09	1,217	0.96	587			
Israel	0.98	6	0.95	17			
Asia	0.99	160	1.03	36			
Africa	0.77	11	-	-			
Americas	0.84	32	0.74	2			
Australia	0.92	28	0.84	4			
Diversified Multi-Regional	0.95	23	-	-			
Europe	1.01	413	0.92	64			

Panel B: Burgiss								
	Privat	e equity	Venture	e capital				
	PME	Num. of Funds	PME	Num. of Funds				
US	1.12	1,015	1.02	2,738				
Asia & Pacific	1.14	141	1.14	460				
Middle East & Africa	0.82	15	0.96	54				
Americas	0.83	22	1.26	14				
Europe	1.11	489	0.93	218				

Table 5: Israeli and foreign fund performance

This table presents estimates of heterogeneity in fund performance between Israeli and foreign funds. The dependent variable is the fund PME relative to three benchmarks: Tel Aviv 125, S&P 500, and the Russell 2000. We use the ETFs which track these indices,: 'KESEM TA 125' ETF; the 'SPDR' ETF; and 'iShares Russell 2000' ETF. Cash flows, NAVs and returns are all converted to local currency. The dummy variable *Israel* equals one if the fund is local and zero otherwise. We include fund vintage year, LP and fund type (buyout, VC, infrastructure, hedge fund, real estate, and debt) fixed effects. Buyout funds are the omitted category. Standard errors clustered at the unique fund level and the vintage year level, and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.5, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

		S&P 500			TA 125			Russell 2000)
Israel	0.113^{***} (0.0340)	0.100^{***} (0.0333)	0.109^{***} (0.0377)	0.192^{***} (0.0399)	0.171^{***} (0.0391)	0.173^{***} (0.0432)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.139^{***} \\ (0.0351) \end{array}$	0.125^{***} (0.0343)	0.125^{***} (0.0382)
Debt Funds			-0.0932^{*} (0.0478)			-0.164^{***} (0.0562)			-0.108^{**} (0.0493)
Hedge Funds			-0.0355 (0.0423)			-0.134^{***} (0.0454)			-0.0477 (0.0427)
Infrastructure Funds			-0.0805 (0.0570)			-0.0905 (0.0671)			-0.0778 (0.0590)
VC Funds			-0.107^{*} (0.0553)			-0.145^{**} (0.0644)			-0.0877 (0.0572)
Real Estate Funds			-0.125^{***} (0.0424)			-0.138^{***} (0.0472)			-0.119^{***} (0.0452)
Constant	$\begin{array}{c} 0.497^{***} \\ (0.110) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.659^{***} \\ (0.136) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.773^{***} \\ (0.138) \end{array}$	0.290^{***} (0.100)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.480^{***} \\ (0.136) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.651^{***} \\ (0.140) \end{array}$	0.386^{***} (0.0997)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.544^{***} \\ (0.128) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.649^{***} \\ (0.132) \end{array}$
Vintage Year FE LP FE	YES NO	YES YES	YES YES	YES NO	YES YES	YES YES	YES NO	YES YES	YES YES
Fund Type FE	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Observations R^2	$\begin{array}{c} 1,415\\ 0.057\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 1,415\\ 0.096\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 1,415\\ 0.105\end{array}$	$1,415 \\ 0.139$	$\begin{array}{c} 1,415\\ 0.169\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 1,415\\ 0.181\end{array}$	$1,415 \\ 0.089$	$\begin{array}{c} 1,415\\ 0.130\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 1,415\\ 0.136\end{array}$

Table 6: First-time and seasoned fund performance

This table presents estimates of differences in fund performance between first-time and seasoned funds for the entire sample of funds and within subsamples of Israeli and foreign funds. The analysis excludes hedge funds. The dependent variable is the PME of each fund using the 'SPDR' ETF to benchmark against the S&P 500. Cash flows, NAVs and returns are all converted to local currency. The dummy variable *First-Time Funds* equals one for newly established funds and zero otherwise. We include fixed effects for fund vintage year, LP and fund type (buyout, VC, infrastructure, real estate, and debt). Buyout funds are the omitted category. Standard errors clustered at the unique fund level and the vintage year level, and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.5, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

	All Funds	Foreign Funds	Local Funds
First-Time Funds	-0.0618*	-0.0976***	-0.0484
	(0.0352)	(0.0350)	(0.0646)
	0 101**	0.0050	0.194
Debt Funds	-0.121	-0.0252	-0.134
	(0.0503)	(0.0461)	(0.128)
Infrastructure Funds	-0.0834	-0.0708	-0.0976
	(0.0570)	(0.0525)	(0.0957)
Real Estate Funds	-0.142***	-0.0745*	-0.179
	(0.0462)	(0.0428)	(0.134)
VC	-0.0516	-0.0415	-0.112
	(0.0466)	(0.0843)	(0.0677)
Constant	0.835^{***}	0.414^{***}	1.064^{***}
	(0.143)	(0.105)	(0.186)
Vintage FE	YES	YES	YES
LP FE	YES	YES	YES
Fund Type FE	YES	YES	YES
Observations	$1,\!171$	650	521
R^2	0.134	0.175	0.162

Table 7: Israeli and foreign fund performance - First-time and seasoned funds

This table presents estimates of heterogeneity in fund performance across Israeli and foreign funds, split into first-time and seasoned funds. The analysis excludes hedge funds. The dependent variable is the PME of each fund relative to three benchmarks: Tel Aviv 125, S&P 500, and the Russell 2000. We use the ETFs which track these indices, 'KESEM TA 125' ETF to benchmark against the TA 125; the 'SPDR' ETF to benchmark against the S&P 500; and 'iShares Russell 2000' ETF to benchmark against the Russell 2000. Cash flows, NAVs and returns are all converted to local currency. The dummy variable *Israel* equals one if the fund is local and zero otherwise. We include fixed effects for the vintage year of the fund, the LP, and the type of the fund (buyout, VC, infrastructure, real estate, and debt). Buyout funds are the omitted category. Standard errors clustered at the unique fund level and at the vintage year level, and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.5, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

	First time Funds			Se	Seasoned Funds			
	S&P 500	TA 125	Russell 2000	S&P 500	TA 125	Russell 2000		
Israel	0.206***	0.256^{***}	0.212^{***}	0.0807^{*}	0.164^{***}	0.105**		
	(0.0784)	(0.0840)	(0.0791)	(0.0434)	(0.0597)	(0.0469)		
Debt Funds	-0.0250	-0.0727	-0.0309	-0.0966	-0.130*	-0.117		
	(0.0772)	(0.0858)	(0.0798)	(0.0678)	(0.0702)	(0.0716)		
Infrastructure Funds	0.132	0.215	0.165	-0.189***	-0.241***	-0.200***		
	(0.149)	(0.174)	(0.155)	(0.0505)	(0.0617)	(0.0535)		
Real Estate Funds	-0.0359	-0.0463	-0.0195	-0.107^{*}	-0.141**	-0.107^{*}		
	(0.0748)	(0.0827)	(0.0779)	(0.0557)	(0.0616)	(0.0601)		
VC Funds	-0.0594	-0.137	-0.0118	-0.0743	-0.112	-0.0691		
	(0.113)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.0574)	(0.0765)	(0.0620)		
Constant	0.533**	0.481**	0.391^{*}	0.769***	0.577^{***}	0.647^{***}		
	(0.219)	(0.220)	(0.216)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.166)		
Vintage Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
LP FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Fund Type FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Observations	440	440	440	731	731	731		
R^2	0.184	0.228	0.201	0.150	0.251	0.196		

Table 8: Performance of funds with reinvestment vs. abandoned funds

This table presents the performance of investments in funds where the LPs decided to invest in. subsequent follow-on funds ("reinvested funds") and funds where the LPs did not invest in any follow-on funds even though they were introduced ("abandoned funds"). PMEs are calculated relative to the S&P 500 using the 'SPDR' ETF. PE and VC funds are split into local and foreign funds for both reinvested and abandoned funds. *, **, and *** represent significance of one-tailed t-tests at the 0.1, 0.5, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

	Reinvested	Num. of Funds	Abandoned	Num. of Funds	Difference
Private Equity	1.18	245	0.92	201	0.26***
Foreign	1.10	134	0.89	145	0.21***
Israel	1.29	111	0.99	56	0.30***
Venture Capital	1.15	113	0.76	120	0.39***
Foreign	0.96	1	0.81	28	0.15
Israel	1.16	112	0.75	92	0.44^{***}

Table 9: LP experience and the performance of new investments

This table presents estimates of the effects of LP experience proxied by the number of past investments in PE and VC funds on subsequent performance. The dependent variable is PME relative to the S&P 500 benchmark, and the explanatory variables are the natural logarithm of the cumulative number of past investments for each LP, LP vintage year, and fund type (PE, VC, infrastructure, real estate, debt) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the unique fund level and at the vintage year level, and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.5, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

	All Funds				Only PE/VC			
	All Funds	Local	Foreign	All Funds	Local	Foreign		
		Funds	Funds		Funds	Funds		
LP Experience	-0.145**	-0.0901	-0.150**	-0.179^{*}	-0.113	-0.376***		
	(0.0570)	(0.0836)	(0.0642)	(0.0914)	(0.108)	(0.111)		
Constant	0.741***	0.890***	0.336***	0.774^{***}	0.921***	0.367***		
	(0.142)	(0.164)	(0.0513)	(0.161)	(0.189)	(0.126)		
Vintage FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
LP FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Fund Type FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Observations	1,415	577	838	800	433	367		
R^2	0.108	0.166	0.134	0.166	0.192	0.276		

Table 10: Comparison of fund performance with data from Preqin

This table presents a comparison of the performance of PE and VC funds, local and foreign, in our data set and on Preqin. We calculate PME values relative to the S&P 500 using the 'SPDR' ETF. Panel A includes the average PME for funds listed in our data set and in Preqin under the exact same LP that have cash flows reported in Preqin. Panel B includes funds listed in our database and in Preqin under the exact same LP with no cash flows reported in Preqin. Panel C includes the funds listed in our data set but not in Preqin. Panel D includes the funds listed in Preqin but not in our data set. The columns present the PMEs in each data set and the number of funds. Cash flows, NAVs and returns are all converted to local currency.

Panel A: Funds in both data sets under the same LP and have cash flow in Preqin								
	PME, our data	PME, Preqin	Num. of Funds					
PE Foreign	1.02	1.02	87					
PE Israel	0.97	1.02	5					
VC Foreign	1.03	0.97	4					
VC Israel	1.21	0.99	7					
All Funds	1.03	1.02	103					

Panel B: Funds in both data sets under the same LP but no cash flows in Preqin									
	PME, our data PME, Preqin Num. of Funds								
PE Foreign	0.91	-	68						
PE Israel	1.17	-	26						
VC Foreign	0.88	-	14						
VC Israel	0.92	-	66						
All Funds	0.95	-	174						

Panel C: Funds listed in our database but not in Preqin									
	PME, our data PME, Preqin Num. of Funds								
PE Foreign	0.92	-	94						
PE Israel	0.94	-	26						
VC Foreign	0.96	-	1						
VC Israel	0.98	-	26						
All Funds	0.93	-	147						

Panel D: Fur	Panel D: Funds listed in Preqin database but not in our database								
	PME, our data PME, Preqin Num. of Funds								
PE Foreign	-	1.03	1,739						
PE Israel	-	0.93	1						
VC Foreign	-	1.01	526						
VC Israel	-	0.98	7						
All Funds	-	1.02	2,273						

Table 11: Fund size and country comparison

This table presents a comparison of the country of incorporation and the average fund size, in millions of U.S. dollars, for PE and VC funds in our data set and in Preqin. Panels A and C present the distribution of countries and average fund size for funds which are listed in our data set and in Preqin. Panels B and D present the distribution of countries and average fund size for funds which are listed in our data set but not in Preqin . The fund size and country of incorporation for overlapping funds are collected from Preqin. The data for the non-overlapping funds are collected from the missing information is hand-collected from the fund websites.

Panel A: Number	Panel A: Number of funds listed in our data set and in Preqin								
	U.S.	Israel	UK	Other	Total				
Private Equity	98	31	36	21	186				
Venture Capital	14	72	-	5	91				
Panel B: Number	of funds liste	ed in our data s	et but not in l	Preqin					
	U.S.	Israel	UK	Other	Total				
Private Equity	71	26	10	13	120				
Venture Capital	1	26	-	-	29				
Panel C: Average	size (Millions	s of dollars) of f	unds listed in	our data set ar	nd in Preqin				
	U.S.	Israel	UK	Other	Total				
Private Equity	$3,\!575$	270	4,454	1,913	2,991				
Venture Capital	610	104	-	198	181				
Panel D: Average	size (Millions	s of dollars) of f	unds listed in	our data set bi	it not in Preqin				
	U.S.	Israel	UK	Other	Total				
Private Equity	2,081	150	450	614	1,378				
Venture Capital	100	169	-	-	166				

Table 12: Probability of inclusion in Preqin

This table presents Probit regressions estimating the effect of PE and VC fund characteristics on the probability of being listed in the Preqin. data set. We estimate the effect of fund performance using the PME, relative to the 'SPDR' ETF which tracks the S&P 500, and the IRR. Cash flows, NAVs and returns are all converted to local currency. We estimate the effect of fund size, in millions of US dollars; vintage year, with funds established before 2008 as the omitted category; and country of incorporation, with funds located in the US are the omitted category. We perform the estimation using three samples: Funds located in the US; funds located outside the US and the entire sample. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.5, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

	PME			IRR			
_	(US)	(Non-US)	(All Funds)	(US)	(Non-US)	(All Funds)	
Performance	1.442***	0.507^{*}	0.750^{***}	0.0137^{*}	0.0135**	0.0136***	
	(0.526)	(0.287)	(0.258)	(0.00701)	(0.00616)	(0.00453)	
Log(AUM)	0.218^{***}	0.278***	0.211***	0.190**	0.257***	0.198^{***}	
	(0.0748)	(0.0910)	(0.0564)	(0.0769)	(0.0959)	(0.0588)	
Vintage (2008 - 2010)	-0.0662	-0.239	-0.245	-0.0232	-0.192	-0.274	
	(0.498)	(0.363)	(0.282)	(0.513)	(0.406)	(0.301)	
Vintage (2011 - 2013)	-0.355	-0.961**	-0.773***	-0.152	-1.145***	-0.809***	
	(0.485)	(0.379)	(0.289)	(0.518)	(0.408)	(0.310)	
Vintage (2014 - 2019)	-0.00348	-0.935***	-0.585**	0.186	-0.899***	-0.517**	
	(0.424)	(0.293)	(0.234)	(0.442)	(0.319)	(0.249)	
Europe		-0.722	0.544**		-0.534	0.627**	
		(0.616)	(0.229)		(0.645)	(0.246)	
Israel		-1.064*	0.00402		-0.855	0.203	
		(0.628)	(0.226)		(0.654)	(0.241)	
Other			1.297^{**}			1.120^{*}	
			(0.583)			(0.596)	
Observations	151	207	358	138	191	329	
Pseudo \mathbb{R}^2	0.11	0.15	0.11	0.07	0.15	0.11	
Fund Type FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	

Table 13: Probability of availability of cash flows in Preqin

This table presents Probit regressions estimating the effect of PE and VC funds characteristics on the probability of having cash flow information. reported in Preqin (the sample include only funds listed in Preqin). We estimate the effect of fund performance using the PME (relative to the 'SPDR' ETF which tracks the S&P 500), and the IRR. Cash flows, NAVs and returns are all converted to local currency. We estimate the effect of fund size (in millions of US dollars), vintage year (funds established before 2008 are the omitted category) and country of incorporation (funds located in the US are the omitted category). We perform this estimation using three samples: Funds located in the US; funds located outside the US; and the entire sample. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.5, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

		PME		IRR			
	(US)	(Non-US)	(All Funds)	(US)	(Non-US)	(All Funds)	
Performance	1.660**	0.749^{**}	0.565^{**}	0.0280**	0.0104	0.0141**	
	(0.120)	(0.213)	(0.0979)	(0.0109)	(0.00741)	(0.00600)	
Log(AUM)	0.430***	1.115^{***}	0.625***	0.510^{***}	0.971^{***}	0.706^{***}	
	(0.120)	(0.213)	(0.0979)	(0.134)	(0.177)	(0.108)	
Vintage (2008 - 2010)	1.030	0.620	0.691^{*}	0.583	0.470	0.351	
	(0.704)	(0.469)	(0.366)	(0.734)	(0.466)	(0.377)	
Vintage (2011 - 2013)	1.916^{***}	0.507	1.010^{***}	1.383^{*}	0.398	0.637	
	(0.715)	(0.468)	(0.376)	(0.760)	(0.508)	(0.402)	
Vintage (2014 - 2019)	1.383^{**}	-0.309	0.514^{*}	1.161^{*}	-0.322	0.239	
	(0.585)	(0.418)	(0.304)	(0.641)	(0.429)	(0.321)	
Europe			-0.233			-0.481*	
			(0.276)			(0.287)	
Israel			-0.124			-0.106	
			(0.319)			(0.330)	
Other			-0.188			-0.536	
			(0.474)			(0.497)	
Observations	98	152	250	91	150	241	
Pseudo \mathbb{R}^2	0.25	0.50	0.39	0.28	0.48	0.42	
Fund Type FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	

Internet Appendix

This Internet Appendix provides supplemental and robustness tests to accompany the results

presented in the paper:

Private Equity and Venture Capital Fund Performance: Evidence from a Large Sample of Israeli Limited Partners

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Table A1: Number of commitments by vintage year

This table presents the aggregate number of commitments by LPs in our data set throughout the sample period (vintage years), categorized by different types of funds. Panel A presents commitments to local funds and Panel B presents the commitments to foreign funds.

Panel A:	Israeli funds					
Vintage	PE	VC	Infrastructure	Real estate	Debt	Hedge
2000	-	6	-	-	-	-
2001	4	9	-	-	-	-
2002	4	11	-	-	-	-
2003	3	13	-	-	-	-
2004	10	3	-	-	-	-
2005	20	18	1	1	-	2
2006	21	14	3	-	-	3
2007	4	19	1	-	-	6
2008	33	32	2	2	-	7
2009	11	4	-	-	7	2
2010	4	4	1	1	-	2
2011	6	9	7	1	1	-
2012	10	13	2	1	-	1
2013	6	3	2	-	2	3
2014	9	9	6	2	1	2
2015	13	18	9	6	-	-
2016	16	13	10	1	1	2
2017	20	7	7	3	2	14
2018	10	24	6	2	-	9
Total	204	229	57	20	14	53

Panel B: F	Foreign fund	s				
Vintage	PE	VC	Infrastructure	Real estate	Debt	Hedge
2000	-	1	-	-	-	-
2001	-	-	-	-	-	-
2002	1	-	-	-	-	2
2003	1	-	1	1	-	6
2004	2	1	2	2	-	9
2005	8	2	4	11	5	21
2006	9	-	-	6	11	33
2007	22	5	2	13	18	18
2008	35	6	4	27	6	42
2009	1	1	1	1	1	16
2010	6	-	-	4	-	11
2011	16	2	2	2	2	9
2012	16	-	1	3	2	5
2013	13	-	1	1	1	3
2014	26	1	2	7	2	8
2015	38	3	3	13	3	-
2016	54	4	10	10	13	2
2017	39	4	1	25	10	2
2018	49	2	9	29	8	4
Total	336	31	43	155	82	191

Table A2: Total amount of commitments by vintage year

This table presents the aggregate commitment amounts (in millions of US dollars) by LPs in our data set throughout the sample period, categorized by different types of funds. Panel A presents the commitments to local funds and Panel B presents the commitments to foreign funds.

Panel A: I	Israeli funds					
Vintage	PE	VC	Infrastructure	Real estate	Debt	Hedge
2000	-	21	-	-	-	-
2001	-	2	-	-	-	-
2002	-	11	-	-	-	-
2003	6	2	-	-	-	-
2004	73	6	-	-	-	-
2005	86	53	6	3	-	11
2006	134	32	19	-	-	10
2007	14	86	15	-	-	34
2008	305	168	7	9	-	19
2009	89	47	-	-	237	1
2010	45	9	60	12	-	7
2011	18	57	166	0	0	-
2012	186	56	44	2	-	1
2013	76	21	76	-	1	22
2014	93	22	117	28	3	12
2015	134	95	169	98	-	-
2016	90	106	91	7	-	19
2017	114	13	19	2	4	110
2018	103	71	42	14	-	76
Total	1,570	877	828	175	245	322

Panel B: I	Foreign funds					
Vintage	PE	VC	Infrastructure	Real estate	Debt	Hedge
2000	-	2	-	-	-	-
2001	-	-	-	-	-	-
2002	1	-	-	-	-	17
2003	1	-	0	1	-	33
2004	4	8	30	15	-	26
2005	104	4	56	71	33	153
2006	93	-	-	70	68	201
2007	149	38	40	108	99	119
2008	508	32	42	146	36	313
2009	27	23	9	18	2	32
2010	111	-	-	44	-	140
2011	255	40	37	21	35	12
2012	209	-	25	111	23	19
2013	186	-	11	20	123	34
2014	592	22	173	136	49	110
2015	771	40	134	233	139	-
2016	921	44	61	109	262	33
2017	658	83	19	350	429	59
2018	587	10	361	397	437	19
Total	5,176	345	996	1,850	1,735	1,320

Table A3: Performance of PE and VC funds – Nostro accounts vs. savings products

This table presents average PME for PE and VC funds invested in by each of the institutions in the sample with a nostro account, as well as saving products managed for external savers. The labels correspond to the institutions' labels in earlier tables. The PME values are calculated relative to an ETF tracking the S&P 500, the 'SPDR' ETF. Cash flows, NAVs and returns are all converted to local currency.

Institution	В	С	Ε	F	G	
Provident Funds	0.97	1.35	0.88	0.91	1.06	
Life Insurance	0.91	0.88	0.89	0.94	0.98	
Pension Funds	0.97	0.92	0.88	0.96	1.02	
Nostro Account	0.93	0.88	0.84	1.21	0.97	

Table A4: Foreign and Israeli fund performance - Funds established before 2010

This table present estimates of fund performance for Israeli and foreign funds that were established before 2010. The dependent variable is the PME of each fund relative to three benchmarks: Tel Aviv 125, S&P 500, and the Russell 2000. We use the ETFs which track these indices, 'KESEM TA 125' ETF to benchmark against the TA 125; the 'SPDR' ETF to benchmark against the S&P 500; and 'iShares Russell 2000' ETF to benchmark against the Russell 2000. Cash flows and returns are all converted to local currency (NAVs for old funds are typically zero). The dummy variable *Israel* equals one if the fund is local and zero otherwise. We control for the vintage year of the fund, the identity of the LP, and the type of the fund (buyout, VC, infrastructure, hedge fund, real estate, and debt). Buyout funds are the omitted category. Standard errors clustered at the unique fund level and at the vintage year level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.5, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

	S&P 500			TA 125			Russell 2000		
Israel	0.112^{*} (0.0597)	0.135^{**} (0.0564)	0.165^{**} (0.0660)	0.229^{***} (0.0691)	0.224^{***} (0.0660)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.211^{***} \\ (0.0779) \end{array}$	$0.134^{**} \\ (0.0593)$	0.158^{***} (0.0561)	0.170^{**} (0.0656)
Debt Funds			-0.155 (0.0944)			-0.284^{**} (0.110)			-0.182^{*} (0.0961)
Hedge Funds			0.0188 (0.0604)			-0.124^{*} (0.0685)		(0.0612)	-0.00234
Infrastructure Funds			-0.0898 (0.111)			-0.0849 (0.133)			-0.0787 (0.109)
Real Estate Funds			-0.199^{***} (0.0682)			-0.229^{***} (0.0795)			-0.201^{***} (0.0685)
VC Funds			-0.168^{**} (0.0838)			-0.210^{**} (0.0975)			-0.142^{*} (0.0845)
Constant	0.498^{***} (0.118)	1.095^{***} (0.343)	1.177^{***} (0.359)	0.259^{**} (0.111)	1.103^{**} (0.437)	1.313^{***} (0.449)	0.390^{***} (0.108)	0.988^{***} (0.348)	1.080^{***} (0.366)
Vintage Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
LP FE	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Fund Type FE	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Observations R^2	$\begin{array}{c} 664 \\ 0.046 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 664 \\ 0.105 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 664 \\ 0.127 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 664 \\ 0.116 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 664 \\ 0.155 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 664 \\ 0.174 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 664 \\ 0.059 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 664 \\ 0.119 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 664 \\ 0.137 \end{array}$

Table A5: Israeli and foreign fund performance - Controlling for the size of the fund

This table presents estimates of heterogeneity in fund performance between Israeli and foreign funds. The dependent variable is the fund PME relative to three benchmarks: Tel Aviv 125, S&P 500, and the Russell 2000. We use the ETFs which track these indices,: 'KESEM TA 125' ETF; the 'SPDR' ETF; and 'iShares Russell 2000' ETF. Cash flows, NAVs and returns are all converted to local currency. The dummy variable *Israel* equals one if the fund is local and zero otherwise. We include fund vintage year, LP and fund type (buyout or VC) fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the unique fund level and the vintage year level, and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.5, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

		S&P 500			TA 125			Russell 20	000
Israel	0.112^{**} (0.0544)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0931^{*} \ (0.0535) \end{array}$	0.117^{**} (0.0581)	0.174^{***} (0.0649)	0.144^{**} (0.0644)	0.180^{**} (0.0696)	0.139^{**} (0.0579)	0.117^{**} (0.0565)	0.137^{**} (0.0610)
Log (AUM)	0.00593 (0.0158)	$0.0154 \\ (0.0159)$	0.00114 (0.0163)	0.0103 (0.0182)	0.0167 (0.0185)	-0.00410 (0.0190)	0.00679 (0.0165)	$0.0168 \\ (0.0165)$	$0.00516 \\ (0.0167)$
VC Funds			-0.129^{**} (0.0615)			-0.188^{**} (0.0734)			-0.106^{*} (0.0634)
Constant	0.457^{**} (0.181)	0.656^{***} (0.209)	0.820^{***} (0.211)	$0.230 \\ (0.187)$	0.466^{**} (0.223)	0.706^{***} (0.226)	0.336^{*} (0.176)	0.534^{***} (0.205)	0.669^{***} (0.207)
Vintage FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
LP FE	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Fund Type FE	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
$\frac{\text{Observations}}{R^2}$	$\begin{array}{c} 710 \\ 0.110 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 710 \\ 0.163 \end{array}$	$710\\0.172$	$710 \\ 0.171$	$710\\0.204$	$710 \\ 0.217$	$710 \\ 0.138$	$\begin{array}{c} 710 \\ 0.194 \end{array}$	$710 \\ 0.199$

Table A6: Comparison of fund performance based on IRR with data from Preqin

This table presents a comparison of the performance of PE and VC funds, local and foreign, in our data set and in Preqin, using IRR as the performance metric. Panel A includes the average IRR for funds which are listed in our data set and also in Preqin and have cash flow data in Preqin. Panel B includes funds which are listed in our data set and also in Preqin, but do not have cash flow data in Preqin. Panel C includes the funds which are held by LPs in our sample but are not listed in Preqin. Cash flows, NAVs and returns are all converted to local currency.

Panel A: Funds in both data sets under the same LP and have cash flow in Preqin					
	IRR, our data	IRR, Preqin	Num. of Funds		
PE Foreign	12.04~%	12.50~%	87		
PE Israel	-6.79%	-6.46%	5		
VC Foreign	11.99%	10.67%	4		
VC Israel	18.32%	10.74%	7		
All Funds	11.50%	11.24%	103		

Panel B: Funds in both data sets under the same LP and do not have cash flow in Preqin				
	IRR, our data	IRR, Preqin	Num. of Funds	
PE Foreign	5.04%	-	68	
PE Israel	9.12%	-	26	
VC Foreign	1.74%	-	14	
VC Israel	0.18%	-	66	
All Funds	3.44%	-	174	

Panel C: Funds listed in our data set but not in Preqin					
_	IRR, our data	IRR, Preqin	Num. of Funds		
PE Foreign	1.93%	-	94		
PE Israel	0.28%	-	26		
VC Foreign	7.77%	-	1		
VC Israel	2.38%	-	26		
All Funds	1.81%	-	147		